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REPLY BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT 
Plaintiff submits this brief in reply to the Brief of 
Respondents Texaco Inc., Getty Oil Company and Getty Mining 
Company ("Getty's Brief"). The statement of the facts and the 
statement of the issues on appeal are unchanged from 
plaintiff's opening brief ("Plaintiff's Brief"). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Getty errs when it asserts that an abuse of discretion 
standard of review is applicable to this discovery dispute. 
"The issue whether [materials] are protected by the . . . work 
product doctrine is a question of law." Langdon v. Champion, 
752 P.2d 999, 1001 (Alaska 1988). Accordingly, no deference 
should be afforded to the lower court's decision, particularly 
since this court has before it, as the record on appeal, the 
identical paper submissions that were presented to the trial 
court. 
However, even under an abuse of discretion standard, 
the lower court's failure to "properly identify and apply the 
law to the facts" constitutes an abuse of discretion. Southern 
Idaho Production Credit Ass'n v. Astorquia, 746 P.2d 985, 987 
(Idaho 1987). Therefore, under either standard, the ruling of 
the lower court should be reversed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT ERRED, AS A MATTER OF LAW, IN HOLDING THAT THE 
MEMORANDA ARE PROTECTED WORK PRODUCT. 
It is indisputable that Getty, as the asserting party, 
has the burden of demonstrating the applicability of the work 
product doctrine. See Barclavsamerican Corp. v. Kane, 746 F.2d 
653, 656 (10th Cir. 1984). However, Getty has failed to 
establish that the management investigation undertaken by Mintz 
and Kundert, which was devoid of any attorney involvement, is 
worthy of such protection. 
A. The Memoranda Lack the Requisite Attorney 
Involvement to Constitute Work Product. 
Although criticized by Getty, the rule that attorney 
involvement is necessary to generate protectable work product, 
as stated in the seminal case of Thomas Organ Co. v. Jadranska 
Slobodna Plovidba, 54 F.R.D. 367 (N.D. 111. 1972), is 
nonetheless recognized as the majority view. The Alaska 
Supreme Court recently noted: 
The majority of courts dealing with the 
problem have taken the position that 
litigation is not "anticipated" until the 
expectation of litigation is such that an 
attorney has become involved in the dispute 
and has prepared the documents himself or 
has requested their preparation. 
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Lanqdon v. Champion, supra, 752 P.2d 999, 1005 (Alaska 1988) 
(numerous citations omitted). See also cases cited in 
Plaintiffs Brief at 23-25. The few cases relied upon by 
Getty, to the effect that protectable work product may be 
created without any attorney involvement, see Getty's Brief at 
22-24, are distinctly the minority view. 
In support of its position, Getty places principal 
reliance on the language of Rule 26(b)(3) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, as that Rule was amended in 1970. That Rule 
now provides that a document may be eligible for work product 
protection if it is prepared "by or for another party or by or 
for that other party's representative . . . ." Utah R. Civ. 
Pro. 26(b)(3). Thus, Getty contends, any representative of a 
party may generate work product. 
Plaintiff submits that this portion of the Rule is 
unfortunately worded, and that the Court should not adopt the 
construction opted for by Getty. The Rule must be read 
consistent with its historical policy, to create a zone of 
privacy for the lawyer preparing a case for trial. The 
"representatives" referred to in the Rule should be construed 
to include those people that act as extensions of the attorney. 
Particularly in complex litigation, no one attorney 
can do all the trial preparation. Therefore the Rule was 
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expanded, to extend work product protection to representatives 
that may act as extensions of the attorney engaged in the trial 
preparation process. This interpretation of the Rule (although 
admittedly somewhat at odds with its language) was squarely 
endorsed by the U.S. Supreme Court in U.S. v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 
225 (1975). The Court there stated: 
[A]ttorneys often must rely on the 
assistance of investigators and other agents 
in the compilation of materials in 
preparation for trial. It is therefore 
necessary that the doctrine protect material 
prepared by agents for the attorney as well 
as those prepared by the attorney himself. 
Id,, at 238-39 (emphasis added). The court noted further: 
The sole issue in Hickman related to 
materials prepared by an attorney, and 
courts thereafter disagreed over whether the 
doctrine applied as well to materials 
prepared on his behalf. . . . Necessarily, 
it must. This view is reflected in the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see Fed 
Rule Civ Proc 26(b)(3) . . . ." 
Id. at 239, n. 13 (emphasis added). 
It is undisputed that no attorney ever had any 
involvement in the underlying investigation, or the preparation 
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of the Kundert and Mintz Memoranda. Therefore they cannot, 
plaintiff submits, constitute work product.-^ 
B. Even Those Cases That Recognize the Possibility of 
Protectable Work Product Without Attorney Involvment 
Would Not Extend Such Protection to the 
Kundert/Mintz Investigation. 
Plaintiff recognizes that, as Getty points out, there 
are a small handful of cases in which the courts have extended 
work product protection to documents prepared without any 
attorney involvement. A reading of the cases cited by Getty 
reveals, however, that in each case, the non-attorney authors 
of work product were performing the type of functions that are 
±-' Plaintiff submits that, since the purpose of the doctrine 
is to protect materials that were created "to aid in possible 
future litigation," Janicker v. George Washington University, 
94 F.R.D. 648, 650 (D.D.C. 1982), a document cannot qualify for 
work product protection unless its author is, at the very 
least, part of a team that is purposefully engaged in the 
preparation of trial materials. Unless the materials are 
prepared with an "eye toward litigation," Hickman v. Taylor, 
379 U.S. 495, 511 (1947), they cannot be work product. Getty 
has cited no cases where work product protection has been 
extended to a document whose author had no idea of any 
potential litigation. Plaintiff submits that, as the court 
held in Scott Paper Co. v. Ceilcote Co., 103 F.R.D. 591 (D. Me. 
1984), work product protection will not be extended where "the 
author was reporting his and others* perceptions of the 
opposing parties' position rather than purposefully producing 
materials that would aid in impending litigation." Id. at 597. 
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ordinarily performed by an attorney. Getty cites no case in 
which work product protection is extended to a non-attorney 
author who is simply reporting an investigation of historical 
facts, without any awareness that his investigation has 
anything to do with potential litigation. 
One of the principal cases relied upon by Getty for 
this proposition, Duplan Corp. v. Peering Milliken Inc., 540 
F.2d 1215 (4th Cir. 1976), aptly illustrates this point. In 
Duplan. protection was afforded to materials prepared by a 
conseil en brevets, a French patent representative for which 
there is no American legal equivalent. The documents in 
question were drafted by the patent agent in his capacity as 
the party's representative, and concerned a prior litigation 
and settlement agreement in which he was intimately involved. 
Id. at 1218-1219. Thus, the non-attorney who was afforded 
protection was essentially acting as a lawyer. 
Similarly, in Moore v. Tri-Citv Hospital Authority, 
118 F.R.D. 646 (N.D. Ga. 1988), the other principal authority 
relied on by Getty, diary entries prepared by a party prior to 
retaining counsel were protected because they manifested legal 
thoughts and ideas normally expressed by an attorney. The 
diary contained "[thoughts] about persons who could serve as 
witnesses, attorneys who could assist [the party], and legal 
-6-
arguments that could be made on [the party's] behalf." Id. at 
650. Thus they were protected because, again, plaintiff 
submits, the party was doing the type of thing ordinarily done 
by an attorney. 
None of the cases cited by Getty provides authority to 
extend work product protection to the Kundert and Mintz 
Memoranda. Kundert and Mintz were not acting as Getty's legal 
representatives, as in PupIan; nor were they expressing 
thoughts about legal strategy, as in Moore. In short, neither 
was doing the type of thing that ordinarily would be done by an 
attorney. Instead Kundert, who himself had no idea that his 
investigation had anything to do with any potential litigation, 
merely performed an historical investigation of a purely 
technical matter—whether or not a feasibility study had been 
prepared in connection with the Mercur Project. This is not 
the type of non-attorney investigation that, even under the 
authorities relied upon by Getty, could possibly qualify for 
work product protection. 
C. Non-Legal Corporate Management Investigations Are 
Not Protectable. 
In Plaintiff's Brief, several cases are cited to 
support the proposition that internal management 
investigations, even where litigation clearly is anticipated, 
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cannot result in the creation of work product. See Plaintiff's 
Brief at 28-31. Getty attempts to dismiss these cases on the 
basis that in none of them had there been a prior demand letter 
sent to the party claiming work product protection. Getty 
argues that this case is totally different than those relied 
upon by plaintiff, because here Getty had received a demand 
letter from plaintiff before the Kundert and Mintz 
investigation. 
By making this argument, Getty is attempting to create 
a new legal threshold, under which any internal investigation 
of historical facts made after a demand letter has been 
received, shall remain secret. Getty cites not one case, 
however, in support of this thesis. No authority is offered 
for the proposition that receipt of a demand letter is an 
important factor (or any factor at all) for determining whether 
a document created later is protected work product.^/ Getty 
has simply concocted this alleged distinguishing factor out of 
thin air. 
£-' At least one court has explicitly rejected the notion that 
the receipt of a demand letter provides automatic work product 
protection. In Binks Manufacturing Co. v. National Presto 
Industries, Inc., 709 F.2d 1109 (7th Cir. 1983), a demand 
letter prepared by corporate counsel did not provide the basis 
for work product protection because although the letter 
demanded payment in full of an amount owed, it did not 
explicitly threaten litigation. See id. at 1119-1120. 
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Plaintiff concedes, however, that in certain 
circumstances, the sending of a demand letter may at least be a 
factor bearing on this issue. It still provides no basis, 
however, to distinguish the several authorities cited by 
plaintiff, at pages 28 to 31 of Plaintiff's Brief. In each of 
those cases, the courts expressly determined that although, as 
the courts found, litigation clearly was anticipated at the 
time of their creation, the results of in-house management 
investigations into the underlying facts were not work 
product. Getty's effort to distinguish these cases, on the 
basis of a factor that no court has even considered in this 
analysis—the receipt of a demand letter—is completely 
unpersuasive. 
D. The Work Product Doctrine Does Not Provide a Right 
of Secrecy Simply Because a Threat or Allegation has 
Been Made. 
Throughout its brief, Getty is careful not to analyze 
the issue on this appeal in terms of any of the traditional, 
recognized policy objectives of the work product doctrine—that 
is, preservation of the integrity of the adversary system, 
protection of its trial preparation process, or the protection 
of the thought processes of attorneys. Instead, Getty is in 
reality endorsing a completely new policy objective for the 
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doctrine. Its most candid statement of its true position is 
set forth at page 29 of its brief: 
[W]hen a potential adversary, like Gold 
Standard in this case, makes particularized 
and direct allegations of legal liability, 
an opposing party should be able to begin 
preparations to defend itself against the 
specific allegations asserted by its 
opponent, without fear of compelled 
disclosure of its preparation to the 
accusing party. 
Nowhere, however, does Getty attempt to explain why 
this should be the case. Getty has attempted, subtly, to shift 
the inquiry away from the protection of the adversary system, 
to convince the court to establish a new right—to keep the 
true facts secret as soon as litigation is a prospect. The 
work product doctrine is not designed, however, to hide the 
facts. This court should not endorse Getty's attempt to 
distort the doctrine in this manner. 
II. THE COURT ERRED, AS A MATTER OF LAW, IN FAILING TO APPLY 
THE SUBSTANTIAL HARDSHIP EXCEPTION TO THE WORK PRODUCT 
DOCTRINE. 
A. A Party's Non-Legal Employees Do Not Qualify for 
Opinion Work Product Protection. 
Getty asserts that the Memoranda contain "opinion" 
work product, and therefore are not discoverable even if the 
showing of substantial need and undue hardship has been made. 
Even if the Memoranda are deemed to contain opinions rather 
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than facts,3/ the opinions of non-legal employees do not 
receive the heightened protection afforded an attorney's 
opinions, and are thus discoverable upon a showing of 
"substantial need" of the Memoranda and "undue hardship" in 
obtaining their equivalent elsewhere. 
1. Kundert and Mintz cannot produce opinion work 
product. 
By definition, opinion work product can only be 
created by "an attorney or other representative of a party." 
Utah R. Civ. Pro. 26(b)(3). It does not apply to a party or to 
a party's employees, and thus employee opinions are not 
afforded heightened protection. In North Georgia Lumber & 
Hardware v. Home Insurance Co., 82 F.R.D. 678 (N.D. Ga. 1979), 
the court held that "mental impressions and personal 
evaluations" of a party's employees were discoverable upon a 
showing "similar to that required to overcome" the protection 
afforded ordinary work product. Id. at 680. See also State 
*-' A reading of the Memoranda reveals plainly that they 
contain recitations of historical facts, not opinions. Even 
Kundert's statement that "I explained to Hautala that, in my 
view, the Bechtel work could not be used as a final Feasibility 
Study" (the one statement in the Memoranda most closely 
resembling an "opinion"), is not reported as a presently held 
opinion, but is instead merely a factual account of a statement 
he made to Hautala in 1981. 
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Farm Fire and Casualty Co, v. Perrigan, 102 F.R.D. 235, 237 
(W.D. Va. 1984). 
Getty cites four cases to demonstrate that opinion 
work product may be generated by a "party and its nonattorney 
representatives,"' Getty's Brief at 35, and argues that the 
Kundert and Mintz Memoranda should therefore receive this 
heightened protection. However, none of Getty's cases extend 
heightened protection to the opinions of a party's employees. 
Those cases only afforded heightened protection to 
investigators hired by attorneys, see Laxalt v. McClaltchy, 116 
F.R.D. 438 (D. Nev. 1987); Rodriguez v. McDonnell Douglas 
Corp., 87 Cal. App. 3d 626, 151 Cal. Rptr. 399 (1978), and to a 
representative performing legal duties. See Duplan, supra. In 
fact, in United States v. Chatham City Corp., 72 F.R.D. 640 
(S.D. Ga. 1976), FBI investigative reports were not even 
afforded heightened protection but were subject to disclosure 
upon a finding of substantial hardship. See id. at 643. Thus 
Kundert and Mintz, oS non-legal employees, are not even capable 
of creating opinion work product. 
2. Only purely legal opinions can constitute 
opinion work product. 
A further limitation on opinion work product is that 
it includes only opinions about litigation; it does not embrace 
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non-legal opinions as to the underlying facts. In Sporck v. 
Peil, 759 F.2d 312 (3rd Cir. 1985), cert, denied 474 U.S. 903, 
the court protected "an attorney's legal strategy, his intended 
lines of proof, his evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses 
of his case, and the inferences he draws from interviews of 
witnesses." Id. at 316. Likewise, courts have protected 
opinion letters outlining a party's potential legal claims, see 
Parry v. Highlight Industries, Inc., 125 F.R.D. 449, 452 (W.D. 
Mich. 1989), as well as a party's conception of the law and its 
evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of its case. See 
McKibben v. Mohawk Oil Co., 667 P.2d 1223, 1231 (Alaska 1983). 
In short, the decided cases granting heightened protection to 
"opinion work product" have all addressed opinions somehow 
relating to the litigation process. 
Opinion work product must also pertain to pending 
litigation. Rule 26(b)(3), as it concerns opinion work 
product, avoids the "anticipation of litigation" language used 
earlier in the Rule, and instead only embraces opinions 
generated "concerning the litigation." Utah R. Civ. Pro. 
26(b)(3) (emphasis added). This difference in language 
indicates that only opinions prepared for an actually existing, 
as opposed to merely "anticipated" litigation, are protected. 
To this end, the court in Brown v. Maricopa Superior Court, 670 
P.2d 725 (Ariz. 1983), held that heightened protection "only 
-13-
applies to the case being litigated and not to such material 
prepared for some prior case." Id. at 735-36 n. 8 (emphasis 
added). 
Thus, opinion work product can only be produced by an 
attorney, or one working intimately with an attorney, and must 
consist of legal thoughts and strategies concerning ongoing 
litigation. Getty has not, and cannot, cite any authority 
granting heightened opinion work product protection to 
corporate employees conducting internal factual investigations, 
whose reports do not even mention any actual litigation. 
Therefore, the Memoranda are discoverable upon a showing of 
substantial need and undue hardship. 
B. The Plaintiff Has Demonstrated Both Substantial Need 
And Undue Hardship. 
The lower court did not rule on whether the 
substantial hardship exception applied in this matter, even 
though, contrary to Getty's assertions, plaintiff did present 
this matter to the lower court. In addition to consistently 
reiterating the importance of these documents, plaintiff 
dedicated three pages in its brief below to demonstrate that it 
could not obtain the facts demonstrated by the Memoranda 
elsewhere. R. at 3207-3205. In fact, in that brief an 
argument heading explicitly stated that "Gold Standard Is 
Entitled to These Documents Under the Fraud or Hardship 
-14-
Exceptions." R. at 3193. Thus, because plaintiff adequately 
raised and argued this issue below, the lower court's failure 
to apply this exception is an error of law.4/ 
1. The Memoranda are important both for their 
contents and because they were shown to Texaco. 
The Memoranda are important for a variety of reasons. 
First, they contain a view from Getty's upper management that 
the Bechtel study could not be used as a final feasibility 
study. See Addendum I to Plaintiffs Brief. This view 
directly contradicts Getty's position in this case, and 
specifically contradicts deposition testimony later given by 
Kundert and Mintz on the feasibility study issue. See 
Plaintiff's Brief at 37-41. 
The Memoranda are important not only for the probative 
worth of their contents. In addition, they are important 
because they were the only information available to Texaco when 
it told Gold Standard that its claim regarding the feasibility 
study was a "lame excuse." See Plaintiffs Brief at 41-43. 
They are thus vital to enable plaintiff to prove its claim that 
Texaco deliberately violated Gold Standard's right of first 
4/ Even if this court should determine that this issue was not 
adequately raised below, it still has authority to consider the 
issue on appeal, if "injustice might otherwise result." 
Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121 (1976). 
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refusal, and to demonstrate Texaco's callous disregard, in the 
face of the contents of the Memoranda, of Gold Standard's 
rights. 
Throughout its Brief, Getty attempts to minimize the 
overall significance of the Memoranda, apparently based on the 
view that, if they aren't really very important anyway, 
plaintiff could not have any "substantial need" for them. 
First Getty asserts that Kundert's investigation only 
encompassed documents prepared through October, 1980. See 
Getty's Brief at 9-10. However, the Memoranda themselves 
reveal, to the contrary, that Kundert in fact examined 
documents created well after this date. Getty further asserts 
that "Kundert did not review the documents given to Gold 
Standard in July 1981 which Getty maintains constituted the 
feasibility study . . . ." Getty Brief at 10. The Kundert 
Memorandum itself, however, specifically refers to "the Bechtel 
work" (provided by Getty as part of the alleged "feasibility 
study"), stating that it "could not be used as a final 
Feasiblity Study [since] Bechtel had not reviewed the geology 
and ore reserves because updated data were not available; thus 
the document was incomplete." Addendum I to Plaintiff's Brief. 
Getty also attempts to minimize the significance of 
the Kundert inquiry by contending that the letter from Texaco 
to Scott Smith following the inquiry, wherein Getty denied that 
-16-
it had failed to provide an adequate feasibility study, was 
based on "more complete information provided by those with 
direct knowledge of the circumstances." Getty's Brief at 
9-10. However, this assertion is totally unfounded; Texaco has 
never provided any evidence that any information, other than 
the Memoranda, was relied upon when Getty, on Texaco's behalf, 
told Gold Standard that its claim regarding the lack of a 
proper feasibility study was "contrary to a long series of 
facts and admissions." See Addendum X to Plaintiff's Brief. 
In all events, the ultimate significance of the 
Memoranda is something to be determined by the trier of fact. 
Plaintiff believes they are extremely significant; at trial, 
Getty will be entitled to present any evidence that may detract 
from their overall significance. The fact that defendants may 
have some strategy to "explain away" this damaging evidence is 
no basis, in all events, to shield them from the discovery 
process. 
2. Plaintiff cannot obtain this important evidence 
anywhere else. 
The Memoranda contain a variety of facts relating 
Kundert's and Mintz's perceptions of the Mercur Project from 
1979 through 1981. Although plaintiff, admittedly, might be 
able to obtain some of the background information elsewhere, 
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Kundert's and Mintz1s personal recollections, and particularly 
their statements concerning the inadequacy of the Bechtel 
report, cannot be obtained anywhere else. See Plaintiff's 
Brief at 36-40. 
In addition to the contradictory testimony given by 
Kundert and Mintz, other Getty and Texaco personnel have 
likewise given testimony at odds with the facts evidenced by 
the Memoranda. Although the circumstances giving rise to the 
creation of the Memoranda, see Plaintiffs Brief at 8, 42 
n. 16, help to demonstrate Texaco1s intimate involvement with 
the Kundert investigation, Texaco has denied knowledge of the 
Kundert investigation. H. Edward Wendt, the President of Getty 
Mining who communicated with Mintz regarding Kundert1s inquiry, 
did not recall having received the Mintz memorandum or even 
having been involved in the Kundert investigation. R^_ at 
3102-3097. Similarly, Willis B. Reals, the Texaco Vice 
President who Getty claims initiated the inquiry, testified 
that he never saw the Memoranda and was never told about the 
results of the investigation by Wendt or anyone else. IL_ at 
3107-3106.-^/ 
±' A transmittal from Wendt to Reals, however, plainly reveals 
that the Memoranda were provided to Texaco's Reals. See 
Addendum XIII to Plaintiffs Brief; Plaintiffs Brief at 42 
n. 16. 
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Despite all of this conflicting testimony, Getty 
maintains that plaintiff has not shown sufficient hardship. To 
the contrary, plaintiff has demonstrated blatant contradictions 
between the Memoranda and the testimony of important 
witnesses. This is not "mere conjecture" of a discrepancy in 
testimony, as argued by Getty; the discrepancy between the 1984 
and 1988 statements of these Getty and Texaco personnel is 
palpable. 
III. THE COURT ERRED, AS A MATTER OF LAW, IN FAILING TO FIND 
THAT GETTY WAIVED WORK PRODUCT PROTECTION. 
Getty does not even attempt to seriously address 
plaintiffs arguments on the waiver issue. Rather than discuss 
waiver cases in the context of the discovery of documents 
(which provides no support for Getty's position), Getty cites 
only to general case law on waiver. It argues that since 
Getty's trial lawyers did not know there might be a potential 
claim of work product for the Memoranda,& it could not have 
waived its right to make this claim, even though it 
deliberately produced the documents. 
-&-7 As noted in Plaintiff's Brief at 47, this assertion is in 
and of itself something of an oxymoron. 
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A. Getty's Failure to Maintain the Confidentiality 
of the Memoranda Waived any Work Product 
Protection. 
Getty's argument completely ignores the entire policy 
justification for affording protection to documents in the 
first place—certain documents, whether protected by the 
attorney-client privilege, the work product doctrine, or on 
some other basis, may be eligible for protection if they are 
maintained as confidential. This is because they contain 
materals that, the law recognizes, a party may be entitled to 
keep secret. Once they have been disclosed to the adverse 
party, however, the underlying confidentiality is lost, and 
there is no longer any reason to continue to treat them 
confidentially. That is, once otherwise protectable documents 
have been disclosed, it is no longer possible to achieve the 
benefits of any privilege—i.e., confidentiality—and the 
privilege is lost. See W. R. Grace & Co. v. Pullman, Inc., 446 
F. Supp. 771, 775 (W.D. Okla. 1976); United States v. 
Kelsev-Haves Wheel Co., 15 F.R.D. 461, 465 (E.D. Mich. 
1954)("when the policy underlying the rule can no longer be 
served, it would amount to no more than mechanical obedience to 
a formula to continue to recognize it." (emphasis added)). 
Once confidentiality is lost, the objective of preserving 
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secrecy must yield to the overriding concern of the litigation 
process—ascertainment of the truth. 
Here there is no dispute that Getty "voluntarily 
produced [the Memoranda] after [they] had knowledge that [the 
plaintiff] had them." R. at 3096. After that production, 
Getty thereafter failed to object to the use of the Memoranda 
in numerous depositions. Yet Getty now claims, without citing 
any authority, that there was no waiver because its lawyers 
didn't know they might have a potential work product claim, and 
thus a basis to keep the facts contained in the Memoranda a 
secret. 
Getty's interpretation of waiver fails to recognize 
this cornerstone principle of confidentiality. Getty's view is 
especially untenable where, as here, the Memoranda were 
generated by Getty's own in-house inquiry. After the existence 
of the Memoranda became known to Getty in 1987, a minimal 
internal investigation should have alerted Getty to the 
Memoranda's supposed work product significance. Getty failed 
to make such an inquiry. Instead, Getty now advocates a view 
that rewards it for neglecting to investigate the origins of 
materials within its domain, and penalizes its opponent for 
having used those materials after they were knowingly and 
voluntarily disclosed. 
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B. The Inadvertent Disclosure Exception Is 
Inapplicable Where Gettv Did Not Mistakenly 
Produce The Memoranda. 
Some jurisdictions permit a party who "inadvertently" 
produces materials to have its mistake rectified.-2/ See, 
e.g., Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 104 
F.R.D. 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). Getty and the lower court relied 
upon this doctrine to excuse Getty's production of the 
Memoranda. However, because Getty produced the Memoranda 
knowingly and voluntarily, and not mistakingly, that exception 
has no application to the present case. 
As its title suggests, this exception has only been 
applied to cases wherein a document is produced 
"inadvertently"—that is, by accident. Not one case has 
applied this exception when a party voluntarily produces a 
document and then attempts to retract it by later claiming that 
it was previously unaware of a basis to withhold the document. 
As a matter of law, Getty clearly waived work product 
protection of the Memoranda by voluntarily producing them. 
Getty made no clerical mistake when it produced the Memoranda; 
-L' Some jurisdictions apply instead a strict waiver standard, 
denying protection even when production is inadvertant. See, 
e.g., Thomas v. Pansy Ellen Products, Inc., 672 F. Supp. 237 
(W.D.N.C. 1987). 
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its only mistake was in failing to investigate their origin. 
No recognized legal principle supports Getty's view that its 
claim of work product privilege has not been waived. 
CONCLUSION 
Getty personnel created the Memoranda as part of a 
factual, non-legal investigation, without the involvement of 
attorneys. Thus, the Memoranda cannot be work product, and 
even if they could, they are discoverable based on plaintiffs 
showing of substantial need and undue hardship. Further, Getty 
voluntarily produced the Memoranda, thereby waiving any claim 
of confidentiality for the documents. 
Getty had the burden of demonstrating that the 
Memoranda were within the ambit of the narrow work product rule 
in order to exclude the Memoranda from discovery. They failed 
to do so. Thus, these important and unique documents must be 
made available for plaintiffs use throughout the course of the 
proceedings below. 
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